Qaswara Brings Back the Ghost of ISIS to Lebanon

Originally published at Alhurra by Asrar Shbaro

Weapons, ammunition, electronics—even equipment to manufacture drones.

That’s some of what Lebanese intelligence reportedly seized with "Qaswara," the successor of “Abu Saeed al-Shami,” ISIS’s governor in Lebanon.

So, ISIS is reactivating sleeper cells in Lebanon? Yet a lawyer defending some of the detainees says:

"Don’t rush to judgment. The whole case is just Facebook messages and a PDF file that no one even opened!"

Is ISIS really active in Lebanon?

Is Lebanon fertile ground for recruiting new members and reviving sleeper cells?

Or is ISIS just another pretext to justify Hezbollah’s continued arms?

It’s happening in Bekaa… and Damascus!

The story began with a statement from the Lebanese Army Command on June 24.

According to the details, the Intelligence Directorate announced the arrest of a citizen (R.F.), saying he had assumed leadership of ISIS after the arrest of his predecessor (M.K.), known as “Abu Saeed al-Shami.”

Al-Shami was arrested on December 27, 2024.

Now, a new security operation has led to the arrest of "Qaswara" after surveillance and tracking.

And the timing is notable.

Just two days before the Lebanese operation, across the border, a suicide bombing targeted a church in Syria.

Syrian authorities attributed the attack to ISIS, while an unknown group calling itself "Saraya Ansar al-Sunna" claimed responsibility.

The timing led many to ask: Is ISIS back in force? And why now?

The new governor, known as "Qaswara," is just a simple teacher, says lawyer Mohammad Sablouh, who represents two of the detainees in this security case.

Qaswara is a chemistry teacher from the town of Kamed al-Loz in the Bekaa Valley. He previously worked at Gulf schools and now gives online lessons to students abroad, according to Sablouh.

“What drones is the army talking about?” asks Sablouh. “Even ISIS in Iraq and Syria didn’t use that kind of drone. How could a chemistry teacher in Lebanon make them?”

Sablouh told Alhurra that the army "raided Qaswara’s home again just days ago at dawn and arrested his 22-year-old wife.”

But she was released the same day, "after it was shown that she had no ties to the organization, and that the only accusation was that she had watched ISIS-related content online," he said.

Video and Threats

Qaswara’s arrest isn’t the only sign of the activity of violent Sunni jihadist groups in Lebanon.

Recently, a video circulated on social media showing three men declaring the formation of a group called “Sheikh Ahmad al-Assir Brigade” and issuing threats against the Lebanese state.

Ahmad al-Assir is a Sunni sheikh who led armed clashes against the Lebanese army in 2013 in Abra, southern Lebanon. He is currently imprisoned in Roumieh with a death sentence issued against him for those events.

Alhurra contacted the Army’s Directorate of Guidance for an official comment on the video but received no response.

Lawyer Sablouh, however, questions the video’s credibility, source, and motives.

“Why hasn’t the identity of those in the video been revealed yet?” he asks.

“The only beneficiaries from these messages are the forces that control the ground and operate in the shadows, which may use these visuals for specific security or political agendas.”

But that’s the lawyer’s opinion—and he has a vested interest.

A Bloody History

Just a year ago, in June 2024, a gunman carrying a Syrian passport and wearing an ISIS insignia opened fire near the U.S. Embassy in Awkar.

It was a warning sign that ISIS’s threat had not ended.

Though ISIS had long retreated, reports continued about young Lebanese men being recruited.

In 2021, the disappearance of several teenagers from Tripoli emerged—most were minors. Their families later received calls from them, saying they had arrived in Iraq and joined ISIS, before news came of some being killed there.

It had been years since ISIS’s peak bloodshed in Lebanon.

The group emerged in Iraq in April 2013 and soon spread to Lebanon’s north and the Bekaa.

By early 2014, it launched a series of bombings in Beirut’s southern suburbs.

The threat peaked on August 2, 2014, when ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra fighters attacked the border town of Arsal, taking several soldiers hostage before retreating into the surrounding hills after clashes with the army.

Later, Lebanon witnessed more attacks, most notably the twin bombings in Burj al-Barajneh in 2015.

In summer 2017, the Lebanese army launched “Fajr al-Joroud” (Dawn of the Hills), which ousted ISIS fighters from the Qaa and Ras Baalbek highlands. Hezbollah brokered a deal with ISIS in Arsal that allowed more than 600 fighters to withdraw into southern Syria.

A Fertile Ground?

Years passed.

ISIS was militarily defeated in Syria and Iraq. The U.S. killed its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2019.

Yet the group retains sleeper cells worldwide—including in Lebanon, according to retired Brigadier General George Nader, former commander of the Lebanese Army’s Airborne Regiment.

Nader says sleeper cells still exist—and the environment hasn’t changed much.

He argues that Lebanon is “fertile ground for the spread of extremism,” fueled by “grievances and lack of trust in the state.”

“The structural causes that contributed to the rise of ISIS—especially poverty and armed conflicts—have not been addressed,” he says.

Lebanon borders Syria, which is still unstable—making ISIS’s presence there a reality.

Still, ISIS’s presence in Lebanon “remains limited and fragile,” says Dr. Mustafa Amin, an expert on jihadist groups.

“ISIS does not have a formal ‘Wilayat Lebanon’ (Province of Lebanon), like ‘Wilayat al-Sham’ or ‘Wilayat al-Iraq,’” he explains.

What about recruitment?

“It’s a limited infiltration that doesn’t reflect real capacity for expansion or appeal,” Amin says.

“These are isolated cases, and there’s no indication the group is expanding in Lebanon at this stage.”

He adds that “ISIS has no organized structure inside Lebanon, even if it retains some sleeper cells or loyal individuals, but these cells haven’t been activated in more than seven or eight years.”

Since its appearance, the group has failed to establish a foothold in Lebanon. Its operations were mostly in border areas—and its fighters were later transferred to southern Syria as part of a deal.

While ISIS may still have a limited presence, driven by conditions that allow survival, these factors, Amin says, “don’t allow it to expand.”

A Facebook Message

ISIS maintains a cross-border presence and relies on the internet to penetrate Lebanon.

That’s what lawyer Sablouh claims happened with his client, Abu Saeed al-Shami.

On December 27, 2024, military intelligence arrested three young men, including “Abu Saeed al-Shami.”

Al-Shami had been arrested in 2021 and released later.

“Investigations found that al-Shami received a Facebook message from an unknown account claiming to be affiliated with ISIS, offering him leadership of ‘Wilayat Lebanon,’” Sablouh says.

According to him, al-Shami declined but agreed to distribute financial aid—then later refused to carry out any actions, including a planned bank robbery.

He received a PDF file he couldn’t open, which was later found on his phone during investigation.

The file allegedly contained confessions from an ISIS member about plans for three assassinations in Lebanon. Al-Shami denies knowing its contents and told the judge he was tortured into confessing.

The second suspect, also from Tripoli, was accused of ISIS ties for sending $500 to Syria.

Sablouh says the money was for his deceased brother’s children.

The third suspect, from the Bekaa and working in a money transfer firm, was arrested for wiring $100 to a customer in Syria. He was released after six months.

Lone Cells and Tactical Attacks

Certain Lebanese areas are vulnerable to ISIS infiltration, says Amin.

He cites “Palestinian refugee camps, Sunni-majority regions, and Sunni enclaves within Shiite-majority areas in the south.”

ISIS relies on “individual sleeper cells that could activate at the right moment,” using strategies like “attrition, economic warfare, and sectarian incitement—especially targeting Christians to spark discord.” It may also launch “attention-grabbing tactical attacks.”

Nader warns of the non-centralized nature of ISIS cells:

“A cell in one region knows nothing about another, even if they share the same handler. That makes it hard for security forces to map the full network when one cell is caught.”

Electronic devices used for communication and jamming have also been seized.

Despite its weakness, ISIS retains a central structure led by the so-called “caliph,” with a military council, shura council, and active media arms—most notably the weekly Al-Naba magazine. Its current leader is “the fifth caliph,” known as Abu Hafs al-Hashimi.

Deliberate Exaggeration?

In contrast, Sablouh insists this is all the result of “naive youth and sinister schemes.”

He claims the ISIS-related security file is being exaggerated by Lebanon’s “deep state” to portray itself as fighting terrorism—thus justifying why Hezbollah’s weapons haven’t been disarmed.

Retired Brigadier General Nader doesn’t necessarily agree with that—but also points to the Hezbollah weapons issue.

“The main reason extremism grows in Lebanon is the continued existence of weapons outside the state’s authority—specifically Hezbollah’s,” he says.

That leads some Lebanese to feel betrayed, believing all groups would be disarmed, only to realize the state is strong with some, weak with others.

“That disparity creates a vacuum exploited by extremist groups like ISIS to spread their ideology.”

He refers to a past quote by former MP Khaled al-Daher: “If attacks on the Sunni community in Lebanon continue, we will ask Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa to defend us.”

Nader stresses that unregulated arms fuel extremism and give ISIS an opening.

A Call for Immunity

Extremist groups thrive in chaos, says Amin—exploiting divisions and conflicts to grow.

Ignoring these factors may allow ISIS to gain ground in Lebanon.

He recommends tightening border control with Syria, monitoring suspicious activities, scrutinizing extremist religious rhetoric, and halting dubious funding.

Also:

“Strengthen security forces’ role in curbing illegal arms and promote moderate, tolerant narratives to reinforce national unity and counter extremist ideology.”

Despite the presence of ISIS cells, Nader says Lebanon is not a hospitable environment for the group.

Some attacks may happen, he warns, but:

“The overwhelming majority of Sunnis reject ISIS ideology, believe in the state, and oppose violence and terrorism. Yes, there’s a radical minority—but it doesn’t reflect the general sentiment.”

Nader concludes by stressing the need for security readiness:

“There is effective coordination among security agencies who understand the threat well,” he says.

“Municipalities must remain vigilant—they are the first line of defense and can spot suspicious activity in their areas and report it to authorities, helping to protect society.”