Iraqi Militias Mobilize as Iran-Israel Tensions Reignite Talk of "Unified Front"
Originally published at Alhurra by Delshad Hussein
As military confrontations between Israel and Iran intensify, pro-Iranian militias in the region are on high alert.
In Iraq, home to some of Tehran's most prominent regional proxies, sources speak of "field preparations" supervised by an "operations room of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)." This comes amid a lack of official confirmation or denial from the Iraqi government.
Several Iraqi factions, notably Kataib Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl al-Haq, have threatened to retaliate against any American intervention in the escalating conflict.
Iraqis are sounding the alarm.
Some factions may act unilaterally, expert Ramadan al-Badran warns, potentially "dragging Iraq into a losing war," in the words of researcher Rafid al-Atwani, who is close to the Sadrist-led National Shia Movement.
Iranian Arms Production in Iraq
Iraqi strategic expert Alaa al-Nashou told Alhurra that Iran has, in recent months, supplied its militias in Iraq with drones and ballistic missiles of various ranges, including the "Shahab," "Zulfiqar," and "Soumar" systems.
Tehran's arming of Iraqi militias is not a new phenomenon.
In April 2024, the "Missile Threat" website, a project of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, reported that Iran had supplied its proxies in Iraq with "Fateh-110" missiles.
Furthermore, information obtained by Alhurra from sources within the opposition Iranian Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) points to the existence of Iranian military-industrial companies linked to the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). The sources claim these companies' experts work inside PMF-affiliated weapons factories in Iraq.
The sources, speaking to Alhurra last month, identified companies such as "Rastafan Ertebat," a part of Iran's defense industries specializing in communications equipment, electronics, and weapon components. The firm also supports the IRGC Air Force and Iran's naval missile industries. The list includes "Fanavar Moj Khavar" (Fanamoj), which designs, produces, and tests various missile types.
The intelligence also suggests the presence of Iran's "Shahed" Aviation Industries in Iraq, a firm focused on designing and manufacturing helicopters and drones. "Shahed 101" and "Shahed 136" drones are reportedly shipped disassembled to Iraq and then reassembled in PMF factories.
Reuel Marc Gerecht, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), noted that Iraq is not a secure area for the Iranians. He said it is unlikely they would establish a large-scale operation to export military production capabilities, but that "a smaller-scale operation remains a possible option."
In October 2024, an FDD report stated that Houthi rebels in Yemen and pro-Iranian factions in Iraq had received Iranian drones used in attacks on U.S. forces and a CIA facility in Erbil, the capital of Iraq's Kurdistan region.
Strategic Locations and Deployments
Analyst Abdul Qader al-Nayel described four key locations where Iranian missile and drone shipments have allegedly been distributed. Alhurra could not independently verify these claims.
According to al-Nayel, the sites are:
Jurf al-Sakhar: South of Baghdad, this area has reportedly been converted into a major assembly and storage hub for missiles and drones, concealed within dense agricultural terrain that is difficult to monitor.
Samawa Desert: This southern expanse is used as a potential launch site for targeting locations in the Gulf.
Akashat, western Anbar: Located near the town of al-Qaim, this area serves as a missile launch center for targeting Tel Aviv.
Mount Sinjar: In Iraq's northwest, several "Revolutionary Guards officers are stationed there, alongside missiles and drones ready for use," al-Nayel said.
The PMF: Will Restraints Hold?
While Iraqi militias appear divided on the Israel-Iran war, some observers believe this is more a calculated division of roles than a genuine dispute.
The Shia Coordination Framework, a coalition of Iran-aligned parties, called on the international community to pressure Israel last Sunday. Meanwhile, groups absent from that meeting threatened to join the fight.
Kataib Hezbollah vowed in a statement to attack U.S. bases if Washington intervenes, while Asaib Ahl al-Haq called on "honorable resistance forces" to prepare to support Iran.
Strategic expert Alaa al-Nashou believes the factions' participation hinges on Tehran's orders.
Political analyst Ramadan al-Badran concurred, suggesting that if Iran expands the conflict, "Iraqi militias will participate... turning Iraq into a natural extension for Iranian weaponry and necessitating direct American intervention."
Analyst Ali al-Baidar said Iraq's political forces "will be divided if the escalation continues: one part will remain neutral, another will remain silent, while a third part will stand with Iran... and the government may be unable to control this party."
A media official for the PMF, Ali Saget, declined to comment when contacted by Alhurra.
The Role of the Clergy
Most of Iraq's Shia paramilitaries are organized under the PMF, which was formed in 2014 after Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq's highest Shia cleric, issued a fatwa for jihad kifai (a collective duty) to fight ISIS.
The factions fall into three (general categories: those loyal to Sistani, those who follow Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and those loyal to the cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. The different circumstances under which these factions were founded demand a nuanced understanding of their individual positions, even among groups loyal to the same clerical authority.
Sadr explicitly warned against "the peril of dragging Iraq into a new war" and called for silencing "insolent individual voices" in favor of the "voice of wisdom."
Sistani's office issued a more cautiously worded statement, warning that an attack on Iran's "supreme religious and political leadership" could trigger "widespread chaos." In practice, however, Sistani has not called for retaliation from Iraq, nor has he condemned factions that have.
FDD's Gerecht described Sistani's relationship with Tehran as "very complex." While Sistani is of Iranian heritage and cares for his ancestral homeland, he harbors "deep suspicions... that the Iranians have used Iraqi Shias in the past to pressure him."
"So I don't think you're going to see him try to rally Iraq and the Shia against Israel or the United States. That's probably beyond his power," Gerecht said.
Baghdad's Official Stance
Since the Israel-Hamas war began on Oct. 7, 2023, an umbrella group of pro-Iranian militias calling itself the "Islamic Resistance in Iraq" has launched hundreds of attacks on U.S. and Israeli interests. The group announced a temporary halt to its operations in January 2024.
The Iraqi government has condemned Israeli strikes on Iran but consistently calls for de-escalation.
The IRGC has long promoted a "Unity of the Fronts" strategy, aiming to create a cohesive alliance of its proxies in Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, and Syria. This goal has faltered, however, with Tehran unable to prevent the fall of Syria's Bashar al-Assad or shield Lebanon's Hezbollah from Israeli pressure. Iraqi militias remain the cornerstone of the project.
According to observers, Iran now seeks to revive the "Unity of the Fronts" by pushing its Iraqi factions into the widening conflict.
Iranian arena?
Independent Iraqi politician Mithal al-Alusi described Iraq as entirely an "Iranian arena," asserting that the political parties loyal to the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih (Guardianship of the Jurist) and the IRGC "are military arms of Iran that threaten Iraqis and neighboring countries alike."
"Iraq is part of the Iranian missile system aimed at Israel from Sinjar in the north and Samawa in the south," al-Alusi told Alhurra. "These missiles are also capable of hitting targets in Europe, as well as American bases... while from southern Iraq, the Iranians can target Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain."
Al-Alusi added that the Iraqi militias use the same types of missiles as the Houthis in Yemen.
Political researcher Abdul Qader al-Nayel described the militias' current role as "effective," explaining to Alhurra that they perform several functions. These include pressuring Iraqi institutions to support Iran financially and militarily, sheltering Iranian nuclear scientists, controlling the Shalamcheh border crossing to facilitate movement, and harnessing media outlets to serve Tehran's narrative, including hosting Iranian media to broadcast from inside Iraq.
Origins and map of the Militias
The first Iran-backed Iraqi militia, the Badr Corps, was formed in 1982 from Iraqi Shia exiles to fight against Saddam Hussein's regime during the Iran-Iraq War.
Following the 2014 ISIS offensive, pro-Iranian political groups used Sistani's fatwa as a vehicle to form dozens of new militias. Though ISIS was territorially defeated, Iran continued to expand these factions, which now number over 70 and operate under the legal umbrella of the Popular Mobilization Commission, an official state body.
Alongside these are lesser-known "shadow" militias that act as proxies for the larger groups, their names surfacing since 2020 amid rising attacks on U.S. interests.
Based on information from Iraqi military personnel, politicians, and eyewitnesses, Alhurra mapped the deployment of key pro-Iranian militias:
Jurf al-Sakhar: Controlled by Kataib Hezbollah, the town hosts fighters from Harakat al-Nujaba, Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, the IRGC Quds Force, Lebanese Hezbollah, and even Yemeni and Bahraini militants. It serves as a major weapons production and storage site.
Al-Qaim: On the Syrian border, this area is a hub for Kataib Hezbollah, Saraya al-Khorasani, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, and Liwa al-Tafuf.
Karma District: Kataib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, and Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada control territory here along the Syrian border.
Nineveh Province: The "Babylon Brigades" and "Brigade 30" (Shabak PMF) control the Nineveh Plain, while a mix of larger factions, including the Badr Organization, are present in and around the city of Mosul.
Salah al-Din Province: Major factions including Kataib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, the Badr Organization, and Sadr's Saraya al-Salam maintain bases here.
Diyala and Kirkuk Provinces: The Badr Organization, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, and Kataib Hezbollah are dominant. Diyala's Camp Ashraf now reportedly hosts the Afghan "Fatemiyoun" and Pakistani "Zainabiyoun" brigades, which relocated to Iraq after the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria.
All these groups maintain a significant presence in Baghdad and wield considerable economic power in southern Iraq, controlling commercial activities at ports and border crossings.