Iraqi Militias Loyal to Khamenei...and Sistani's Stance on Uncontrolled Weapons
Originally published at Alhurra by Delshad Hussein
Although the 2014 “Sufficient Jihad” fatwa by Shiite religious authority Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani provided the legal foundation for forming Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), Sistani does not hold field control—at the very least—over many of the factions that had been established years before the fatwa and later joined the PMF. Some of these factions follow the religious authority of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
This report by Alhurra investigates Sistani’s position on the recent confrontation between Iran and Israel, as well as his consistent views over recent years regarding the weapons held by PMF-affiliated militias.
The report also highlights the most prominent Iraqi armed factions, the religious authorities they follow in doctrine, and their political and military loyalties.
Iran and Israel
In a statement about the war between Israel and Iran, issued on Thursday, Sistani called on the international community to exert efforts to stop the war. He warned of widespread chaos that would increase the suffering of the region’s peoples and harm the interests of all if the situation spirals out of control.
Sistani’s stance came amid growing concern among Iraqis that Iran-aligned factions might enter the war, especially after some of them threatened to join the Iran-Israel confrontation in support of Tehran.
The divergence between Sistani’s position and that of the militias was not surprising.
Sistani has long called for the militias to disband, according to academic and writer Aqil Abbas, but these groups have repeatedly circumvented his demands using various pretexts.
Ghaith al-Tamimi, head of the Iraqi Citizenship Project, sees Sistani’s position on the Iran-Israel war as consistent with his previous stances.
According to al-Tamimi, “Sistani implicitly supports the so-called ‘Axis of Resistance’ in regional theaters, but avoids direct involvement in conflicts outside Iraq.”
He told Alhurra, “Fundamentally, Sistani expresses strategic alignment during regional crises in favor of ‘resisting Israel’ within the broader narrative of Shiite and Islamic victimhood—without issuing public fatwas for mobilization or directly entering confrontations with Israel.”
Tamimi believes Sistani’s rhetoric reflects the central role of Najaf’s seminary in the Shiite field, striving to maintain its balance between traditional independence from Iran’s Wilayat al-Faqih system and limited involvement in protecting the broader Shiite community regionally.
Sistani’s moderate discourse has often clashed with the ideological affiliations of various PMF factions that follow different religious authorities.
Factional Landscape
There are estimated to be over 70 Iran-aligned factions within the PMF, possibly nearing 100 if so-called “shadow factions” are included. These lesser-known groups emerged after 2020, especially during rocket attacks on U.S. interests in Iraqi Kurdistan and other regions of Iraq and Syria, often claimed by unknown entities.
According to Alhurra’s investigation, Badr Organization tops the list of Iran-loyalist Iraqi factions.
Badr Organization
Led by Hadi al-Amiri, Badr comprises more than 15 armed factions. Al-Amiri is a well-known military and political figure with religious and political loyalty to Iran’s Supreme Leader.
The Badr militia was originally formed by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard in 1982 under the name “Badr Corps” and fought alongside Iranian forces in the 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq War.
The group follows Khamenei as its religious and political authority. Despite this, Badr holds significant influence in Iraq’s government and parliament and has the largest number of fighters among all factions.
Reports indicate it possesses a large stockpile of heavy weapons and missiles obtained from both Iran and the Iraqi army in recent years.
In addition to financial support from the Iraqi government through PMF brigades, Badr also receives funding from Iran and its own economic offices, which collect financial shares from business deals, investments, and service projects across various Iraqi cities.
Kata'ib Hezbollah (Hezbollah Brigades)
Second to Badr is Kata'ib Hezbollah, also loyal to Wilayat al-Faqih and Khamenei. It includes five factions within the PMF, including Harakat al-Nujaba led by Akram al-Kaabi. These militias took part in the Syrian civil war in support of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.
Formed after Saddam Hussein’s fall in 2005–2006, Kata'ib Hezbollah emerged from an amalgam of Iran’s Quds Force-aligned militias. Its former leader, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, was killed alongside Qassem Soleimani in a 2020 U.S. airstrike near Baghdad Airport. He was succeeded by Ahmad al-Hamidawi.
The group possesses advanced weaponry, including missiles and drones. It participated in all IRGC-led operations in Iraq against coalition forces and carried out numerous attacks on U.S. interests. It also fought under Quds Force command throughout the Syrian civil war until Assad's fall in December 2024.
Kata'ib Hezbollah competes with Badr and Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq for leadership over pro-Iran militias and seeks to expand its financial, political, and military influence. It receives government funding via its five PMF brigades and additional support—military, financial, and intelligence—from Iran’s Quds Force, in addition to revenue from economic offices and major infrastructure projects.
Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq
This is the third-largest Shiite militia in Iraq, also loyal to Wilayat al-Faqih and Khamenei. Founded in 2006 after Qais al-Khazali split from Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army, the group has carried out several attacks on U.S. forces, including a 2007 attack in Karbala that resulted in the kidnapping and killing of five American soldiers.
Qais and his brother Laith were arrested and held at Camp Bucca until 2010, when they were released in a prisoner swap.
The group is closely tied to the Quds Force and is considered part of the "Axis of Resistance." Asa'ib deployed fighters to Syria in 2012 and remained active until Assad’s fall.
Its political arm, the Sadiqoun Bloc, has participated in Iraqi politics since 2014 and gained influence in government and parliament. The group operates three brigades within the PMF and has built a strong arsenal with support from both the Iraqi government and Iran. It also benefits from economic offices managing investments in oil, real estate, tourism, and telecom sectors.
Other Islamic Resistance Factions
Key players include Kata'ib al-Imam Ali, led by Shibl al-Zaydi, and Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, led by Abu Ala al-Wala’i.
In addition to their military role, Kata'ib al-Imam Ali oversees economic operations and maintains ties with Hezbollah in Lebanon, supervised by the Quds Force.
They’ve established shadow business networks for financial support and are implicated in oil smuggling and other black-market trades. In 2018, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned al-Zaydi for acting on behalf of the Quds Force and facilitating operations across Syria and Iraq.
Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada shares similar ties with Iran’s IRGC and participated in attacks on U.S. bases in Iraq and Syria. It receives funding from the Iraqi government, Iran, and economic ventures. Its political arm, Montassiroun, has participated in Iraqi politics since 2018 as part of the Coordination Framework, the ruling Shiite coalition.
After Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attack on Israel, all Iran-aligned Iraqi militias merged under the banner of Islamic Resistance in Iraq. Under this name, they launched drone and rocket attacks on Israel and U.S. targets.
Other Militias
Sarayat al-Salam (Peace Brigades), affiliated with the Sadrist movement, has three brigades and follows the religious authority of Kazem al-Haeri—until his 2022 retirement, after which he advised followers to emulate Khamenei.
Militias like al-Mu'ammal and Ansar Allah al-Awfiya also split from the Sadrist movement and follow Iran’s Supreme Leader.
The Islamic Dawa Party, led by former PM Nouri al-Maliki, controls four PMF militias. Although it claims loyalty to Sistani, it operates independently.
The PMF also hosts four factions loyal to the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, founded in Iran in 1982 and loyal to the Wilayat al-Faqih.
Another militia, Waad Allah, affiliated with the Islamic Virtue Party, follows cleric Mohammad Musa al-Yaqoubi.
Minority militias include Babylon Brigades (Christian, led by Rayan al-Kildani) and Shabak Forces (Ninawa Province), both of which follow Khamenei.
Most Sunni Arab tribes formed local forces to fight ISIS in 2014 and later joined the PMF.
Sistani’s Influence
According to al-Tamimi, since ISIS’s defeat in 2017, various actors with ties to Iran or Qom have embedded themselves deeply in the PMF. While Sistani remains the most legitimate and symbolic authority, he has limited operational control over these factions.
After the war with ISIS ended, Sistani (through his representative Abdul Mahdi al-Karbala’i) urged integrating PMF volunteers into state forces and keeping weapons under state control—warning against exploiting fighters’ sacrifices for political aims.
Despite repeated calls, militias have refused to disarm.
In a November 2023 meeting with the UN representative in Iraq, Sistani reiterated opposition to foreign interference, called for rule of law, disarmament, and anti-corruption reforms.
Pro-Iran militias, however, maintained their arms and continued launching attacks from Iraq on Israel and U.S. interests, supporting Hezbollah until a ceasefire was declared.
Tamimi attributes the militias' rejection of Sistani’s calls to their allegiance to Khamenei. Only a small portion of the PMF—known as the “Shrine Units” (Ali al-Akbar Brigade, Imam Ali Division, Ansar al-Marji'iyya, and Abbas Combat Division)—follows Najaf’s traditional seminary.
Najaf’s Traditional Stance
Shiite jurisprudence permits following different clerical authorities, but Iraqis worry when political and field loyalties align with a foreign government.
Political analyst Aqil Abbas says Sistani’s stance mirrors the traditional position of Najaf’s religious establishment, which historically supports any Arab state confronting Israel—but does not signal any new political position.
He emphasizes that Sistani does not command the PMF but factions may still reference his earlier guidance if they face pressure to disband.
Iraqi factions have not officially joined the Iran-Israel war. Instead, they have organized protests in Baghdad and the south, issuing statements of support for Iran.
Political analyst Jaafar Ziyara told Alhurra that Sistani avoided issuing any direct position on the war, as he is known to steer clear of highly sensitive regional conflicts.
He added, “Sistani focuses on Iraqi domestic affairs and calls for protecting sovereignty and keeping the country away from regional conflicts.”
Ziyara doubts Sistani will issue any written fatwa calling Iraqis to join the Iran-Israel war.